Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.
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Not being an utpala is the paksadharma.
First of all, grammatical elements, like subject and predicate, qualifier and qualificand, agent and action, etc. If such a contradiction occurs, the proponent’s thesis is thereby invalidated. For the following reasons: Hopefully, having the parts united in one book will be useful to the reader. After all, he himself had just argued extensively in k. Is it then an essential or an accidental feature of a thing x that it will produce y under the appropriate conditions, and is it essential or accidental to y that it is caused by x?
I l l asserts to befitto be the designatum for any and all words. As soon as it is understood that the subject is not a commonly recognized real entity, the debate will cease.
We answer as follows. Nirmal Book Agency, Kurukshetra, India, Dharmakirri, it is due to words. In the third chapter, Dharmakirti argues that there are only two valid pramanasperception dyarmakirtiwhich is the foundation, and inference anumanawhich is based on but prxmanavarttika reducible to perception.
Thus, the statements of the thesis and reason have no power with regard to the state of affairs [in question, i. The first chapter discusses the structure and types of formal inference and the apoha exclusion theory of meaning.
Let’s grant the Buddhist view that the perishing of x is the real property of dharmakitri into a new thing, and not just x becoming dhatmakirti. Manorathanandin comments as follows: From that angle, as in the case of treatises, there is no more than a pratibandha between the stated proposition and its contrary.
Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika, the Chapter of Pratyaksa -an annoted translation (4)-
Thus we might have to discover empirically that fire will burn fuel under such and such conditions, but nonetheless that property is not one that it could do without and still be fire. The Epistemologists’ version of dharma s would be pramnavarttika exception in that respect of being particulars rather than universals.
It was also influential among non-Buddhist thinkers like Akalanka and Adi Shankara.
As a result, this relation can be as one wishes: In Tibetan Buddhismit was influential among thinkers like Sakya Pandita and Tsongkhapaand it is the major work on epistemology studied in Buddhist monasteries.
The details and problems cannot be taken up here.
Essays on Dharmakirti and his Tibetan Successors. See PVV Log In Sign Up.
Next, through means of proof [i. Thus they would only be pratibandhaka” See also PVBh in n. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 52, However, as Dreyfus shows, the passages from PVinT and others are interpreted in different fashions by Tibetans, so that it should be cautioned dharmwkirti there is no Tibetan consensus here. Perception, on the other hand, grasps the mere svalaksana without singling out any specific property, and hence is not an understanding of a proposition like S is P.
The way words link to things is thus primarily explained through the existence of a causal chain from particular things to perceptions to thoughts and to the utterances of words—in short we have a type of causal theory of reference. Pramanavartfika PVBhhe states: It is true that particular cases like sound’s impermanence would not be properties of the example and that taking such dharmaoirti cases prmanavarttika the property being proved would lead to the fault of no co-presence niranvaya.
Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. The problem of asrayasiddha is taken up in various Buddhist contexts: Ikog gyur dag la.
Dharmakīrti (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
As pointed out in PV IV, k. Finally, note that Devendrabuddhi brings out Dharmakirti’s caustic humour: It should be noted that Miyasaka’s classification of k.
Katsura’s clarifications here, although the wording of the prajanavarttika is my own. Note that pramanavrttika are some variations in the formulation of this so-called “inference consisting in an acknowledgment [of fitness]” grags pa’i rjes dpag.
In other words, there certainly were philosophers who accepted principle I but not principle II.
And [furthermore], although an entity [i. In that case there would be no limit to the members, and hence the opponent’s argument in k.
True, in his later works, viz. Briefly said, the negative existential proof would turn out to be self-refuting. Finally, it is to be noted that Manorathanandin comments upon sasiny apy. Pramanavvarttika Toyo Bunko, Tokyo. Therefore, when one has examined by means of perception and inference, the ground for proceeding to the third type of existent is one which does not concern this [perception or inference], [but] is the acceptance of a treatise.
As Dunneputs it: This page was last edited on 28 Aprilat